The picture of an ironist who is unwilling to be a liberal and a liberal who is unwilling to be an ironist (Foucault and Habermas) by Kwiek, Marek
Philosophical Excursus IV
The picture of an ironist who is unwilling 
to be a liberal and a liberal who is unwilling 
to be an ironist 
(Foucault and Habermas)
1.
Constructing the figure of the "liberal ironist" -  the inhabitant of 
a liberal utopia sketched in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity -  
Rorty notes his differences with "an ironist who is unwilling to be 
a liberal" and with "a liberal who is unwilling to be an ironist", that 
is with Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas in his account.1 Both 
of them do not fit into his utopia, although for different reasons. Let 
us remind Rorty who says that
the citizens of my liberal utopia would be people who had 
a sense of the contingency of their language of moral 
deliberation, and thus of their consciences, and thus of 
their community. They would be liberal ironists -  ... 
people who combined commitment with a sense of the 
contingency of their own commitment.1 2
Under such conditions, Michel Foucault is not allowed to Rorty’s 
utopia because he lacks commitment in a specific, Rortyan sense 
of the "lack of hope", while Jürgen Habermas is committed and full 
of the social hope in question but he does not have a sense of 
contingency of his own vocabulary of moral reflection. Rorty’s hero 
of the future must be the bearer of both traits at the same time, it 
does not suffice to be merely an ironist or merely a liberal. 
(Incidentally, if one took a look at the philosophy of recent decades, 
it would turn out, with a high degree of probability, that both 
aforementioned criteria could be met only by Rorty himself, for it
1 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 61.
2 Ibidem, p. 61 -  emphasis mine.
is only he who claims that he can combine being an ironist and 
being a liberal).
Rorty, having at his disposal two opposite sides of irony 
(serious/non-serious), for Habermas and Foucault uses its serious 
side (as opposed to Heidegger and Derrida, especially as far as 
the so-called "Heidegger affair" is concerned, to whom he applies 
its non-serious side). The relations with Habermas and Foucault 
are such that Rorty seems to radically distinguish himself both from 
Habermas (with a philosophical rather than political gesture) and 
from Foucault (with a political rather than philosophical gesture). 
Habermas turns out for him to be an admirer of liberal democracy 
devoted to attempts of its universal grounding, providing it with 
"philosophical foundations", while Foucault turns out for him to be 
an anarchist who is unwilling to accept the value of "we" of which 
he would be a representative -  as a philosopher who writes "to 
have no face", as he puts it in Archeology of Knowledge -  for he 
does not see what is perhaps most important for Rorty in his 
philosophizing: the hope to diminish suffering and humiliation. 
(Foucault in Rorty’s redescription masterfully describes cruelty, 
notices it and exposes to the readers but he does not see any hope 
to get rid of it -  he seems to hint, together with Nietzsche, that "you 
and I together, as we, aren’t much -  that human solidarity goes 
when God and his doubles go", as Rorty comments on him in a 
text from Consequences of Pragmatism. ) While Rorty is satisfied 
with using the category "we liberals" -  with the whole range of 
additional adjectival descriptions -  Foucault questions in his 
reading all existing "we’s", all existing social contexts. As he says 
in one of his last interviews (with Paul Rabinow, from May, 1984):
Richard Rorty points out that in these analyses I do not 
appeal to any "we" -  to any of these "we’s" whose 
consensus, whose values, whose traditions constitute 
the framework for a thought and define the conditions in 
which it can be validated. But the problem is, precisely, 
to decide if it is actually suitable to place oneself within 
a "we" in order to assert the principles one recognizes
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Philosophical Excursus IV: Rorty-Foucauit-Habermas 213
and the values one accepts; or if it is not, rather, 
necessary to make the future formation of a "we" 
possible, by elaborating the question. Because it seems 
to me that the "we" must not be previous to the question; 
it can only be the result... of the question as it is posed 
in the new terms in which one formulates it.4
Rorty had no doubts, as was the case with Habermas: 
according to the view of the "priority of democracy to philosophy", 
the "we" of liberals is quite satisfactory and there is no need of 
looking for another "we" than that one in the manner of Foucault. 
Therefore Rorty’s differences with the latter are according to him 
"political" ones, as opposed to "merely philosophical" differences 
with Habermas, as Rorty calls them in inverted commas.5
Rorty’s controversy with Habermas focuses on several main 
points, let us mention three of them: the evaluation of Kant’s 
philosophy, the evaluation of the post-Nietzschean stream of 
philosophy (of Bataille, Lacan, Foucault on the one hand and 
Heidegger and Derrida on the other6), the belief in significance of 
the Enlightenment reason in philosophy and culture. Kant for Rorty 
is a founder and main exponent of the "foundational philosophy", 
"epistemologically-oriented philosophy", deprived of a positive 
influence on today’s culture (the classical division throughout the 
history of philosophy, used by Rorty on numerous occasions, is 
that of good "Hegelians" and bad "Kantians", similarly, Freud - who 
"de-divinizes the self" -  is opposed to Kant -  who "divinizes" it -  
in the domain of moral deliberation etc. etc.). Habermas, on the 
other hand, believes in the power of universal, ahistorical, Kantian 
norms, believes in "reason" which has to be strongly defended 
against its "irrational" critics, for these norms are the foundation of 
a democratic, liberal order. Rorty sees the relation between 
Habermas and Kant in the following way -  Habermas thinks that 
Kant was right as far as purposes were concerned, but his strategy
4 Michel Foucault, ''Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations" in The 
Foucault Reader, p. 385 - emphasis mine.
5 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 67.
6 See especially Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity (Cambridge: the MIT Press, 1987).
was wrong; we can still achieve grounding of which Kant had 
dreamt if we abandon the "philosophy of subjectivity" and begin to 
develop the "philosophy of intersubjectivity". Thus the fault does 
not lie in Kantian Enlightenment rationalism -  it lies in the "subject", 
"just German philosophy’s special, funny little God-surrogate, The 
Subject’".7 "The philosophical discourse of modernity" -  the 
philosophy from Hegel on -  has exhausted its possibilities in 
Habermas’ view. Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault-are subsequent 
stages of the European, philosophical "journey to nowhere" and 
therefore The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity according to 
Rorty is a destructive appendix to Habermas’ philosophy which 
tries to show mistaken roads of today’s, especially French, 
philosophy.
Second, Habermas and Rorty differ in the evaluation of 
post-Nietzschean philosophy; for the former it is the "dead-end" of 
European philosophy (which nevertheless does not undermine 
philosophy as an undertaking that started with Plato and merely 
undermines the bit of it that started with Hegel), for the latter it is 
the "other side" of it, no less justified in being. Rorty says that
people like Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida and Foucault 
are relevant to the private spiritual life of a certain kind 
of intellectual (an intellectual who has been turned on by 
a particular kind of book), but not to politics-or, at least, 
not to democratic politics.8
Rorty, as is known, wants to separate radically philosophy from 
politics -  be it even by means and at the price of "privatization of 
philosophy". Opposing "deep thinkers" and "superficial dreamers" 
(philosophers from the "Plato-Kant canon" and H.G. Wells or M.L. 
King), he says that the latters, like the novelists, have done more 
for the democratic society. For these superficial dreamers suggest 
concrete solutions to concrete problems -  "ways in which things 
might get better -  become more democratic, fairer, more open,
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7 Richard Rorty, "Posties" (a review of Der Philosophische Diskurs der 
Moderne), London Review of Books (3-05-87), p. 11.
8 Ibidem, p. 12 -  emphasis mine.
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more egalitarian, more decent".9 Haberm as in R o rty ’s 
redescription wants to be "deep" and universal -  and for such 
people there is no place in the Rortyan liberal utopia. The 
evaluation of Kant’s significance is crucial here.
And finally, third, they differ in their belief in the significance of 
philosophy in culture. Let us put it briefly, as the theme is present 
throughout the book, that Rorty does not accept "radical social 
theor/ -  choosing instead (at best) "continual social criticism".10 1
That is to say, he prefers criticism as provided by journalists, 
anthropologists, sociologists, novelists, movie-makers because 
they are able to show pain and humiliation in their tiniest details. 
What thus would guard Rorty’s utopia against the said pain and 
humiliation? "Only particular descriptions" that would on the one 
hand incite revolution, on the other force reforms. "Only particular 
descriptions of injury and concrete suggestions about ways of 
avoiding injury"11 (which, incidentally, is part of a much broader 
turn in culture, the turn "against theory" and towards "narratives", 
about which Rorty mentions in an introduction to his book on 
contingency). Theory conducting radical criticism of society has 
been exciting to philosophers since the French revolution, it 
promises them the possibility of getting behind the stage of events, 
behind the mere appearances, reaching the reality in which 
everything, finally, will appear simple (and obviously everything 
will turn out to be the simplest if one manages to find out a single 
evil, just one source of injustice). Rorty says about himself that he 
is more dubious than Habermas about the social utility of 
philosophy. Instead, he advises to put most of one’s liberal hopes 
for the relief of unnecessary, socially-countenanced, pain and 
humiliation in novels, articles and reports that make specific kinds 
of them visible and -  on the other hand -  in proposals for changes 
in social arrangements such as laws, company regulations, 
administrative procedures or educational practices.12
Thus Rorty in his social thinking is in favor of concreteness 
rather than universality which is motivated by him by political
9 Ibidem, p. 12.
10 Richard Rorty, "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", 
a typescript, p. 17.
11 Ibidem, p. 17.
12 Ibidem, p. 21.
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judgement of rich North Atlantic constitutional democracies -  
which do not need "unm asking" any m ore, in which 
"communication" is already "undistorted" (objections are often 
made to Rorty for such a radical political choice -  stating e.g. that 
his philosophy is "little more than an ideological apologia for an 
old-fashioned version of cold war liberalism dressed up in 
fashionable ’postmodern’ discourse"13). Although such a political 
choice may be risky, and perhaps mistaken, but it would be shown 
only by "continued trial and error" rather than by (Habermas’) 
"universalist problematics and strong theoretical strategies".14 To 
return for a moment to themes from other chapters, more for 
human solidarity and for human freedom was done and will 
possibly be done by literature than by philosophy. One does not 
have to say much about Habermas’ attachment to the significance 
of social theory and philosophy due to its obvious nature -  suffice 
it to note that the fundamental criterion in the evaluation of 
Heidegger’s and Derrida’s philosophy is its practical utility: both 
did not provide public legitimation for their philosophizing 
producing socially useless ( at best15), exhausted "philosophy of
13 Richard Bernstein, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward" in The New 
Constellation, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), p. 249.
14 Richard Rorty, "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", 
P- 21.
15 See Habermas' introduction to a German edition of Victor Farias’ book, 
Heidegger et le nazisme, translated as "Work and Weltanschauung. The 
Heidegger Controversy from a German Perspective" in Heidegger: A Critical 
Reader, ed. H. Dreyfus and H. Hall (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 186-208, where 
we says that "under the levelling gaze of the philosopher of Being even the 
extermination of the Jews seems merely an event equivalent to many others. 
Annihilation of Jews, expulsion of Germans -  they amount to the same" (p. 201). 
It is important to add here that the young Habermas’ review of The Introduction 
to Metaphysics shows some thirty years earlier what will be the attitude of 
Habermas to Heidegger’s Nazi involvement when he mentions there explaining 
the latter's fault "in terms of the history of Being" (J. Habermas, "Martin 
Heidegger: On the Publication of the Lectures of 1935" in The Heidegger 
Controversy: A Critical Reader, ed. Richard Wolin, New York: Columbia UP, p. 
186). This theme can also be heard in his interview with Peter Dews when 
Habermas says that Heidegger’s turn was connected only with external events 
-w ith  his disappointment with National Socialism: "one solution was to interpret 
what had happened as an objective, fatal mistake, one for which he was no longer 
responsible as a person -  an error which revealed itself like fate in a Sophoclean 
tragedy", Autonomy and Solidarity (London: Verso, 1986), p. 195.
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subjectivity" rather than socially relevant "philosophy of 
intersubjectivity". Let us note a significant parallel: Habermas’ 
"philosophers of subjectivity" since German idealism -  are as a 
rule Rorty’s "private" philosophers (ironists), while Habermas’ 
"philosophers of intersubjectivity" -  are Rorty’s "public" 
philosophers (liberals). The opposition is analogous in both 
thinkers, what is different is the evaluation made by both of them: 
only Rorty sees non-public philosophy, the one useful only for a 
small circle of philosophers (whose future in the public domain is 
unpredictable), as meaningful. Habermas does not give it such a 
right. Let us say with caution and in general terms that Habermas 
is perhaps one of the last, and surely the greatest of "universal 
intellectuals" -  as Michel Foucault described Jean-Paul Sartre -  
a great heir to a completing Enlightenment tradition, which apart 
from his philosophizing can also be testified by volumes of 
interviews as well as a passionate participation in all recent serious 
social and political debates in Germany.16 As can be seen from 
the chapter from The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity about 
levelling of genre differences between philosophy and literature or 
from a text from Postmetaphysical Thinking about philosophy and 
literature, Habermas differs from Rorty in maintaining a traditional 
division between philosophy and literature as separate genres 
endowed with different tasks inculture.17 Rorty inverts traditionally 
ascribed obligations (as we discuss it in a chapter about the 
"wisdom of the novel" and the "wisdom of philosophy"), the 
philosopher is no longer the guardian of rationality of the society. 
As David Hall rightly puts it: "The aestheticization of culture goes 
along with, indeed has as one of its implications, the privatization
16 As can be testified by the interviews from the aforementioned collection, 
as well as a participation in Historikerstreit, polemics following Farias’ book about 
Heidegger's philosophy etc. etc.
17 See Jürgen Habermas, "Philosophy and Science as Literature?" in 
Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: the MIT Press, 
1992), pp. 205-227. He says e.g. that: "The levelling of the distinction between 
the genres of philosophy and science on the one hand and that of literature on 
the other hand is the expression of an understanding of literature that is derived 
from philosophical discussions. The context of these discussions is the turn from 
philosophy of consciousness to the philosophy of language, specifically that 
variation of the linguistic turn that does away with the legacy of the philosophy 
of consciousness in a particularly relentless way" (p. 207).
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18of the intellect". That privatization of the intellect -  as well as 
more and more “privatized philosophy" resulting from this -  is the 
price to be paid by Rorty for abandoning traditional universalism.
Yet Rorty remembers about the d istinction between 
intersubjectivity and universalism. For instance, he remarks that
Abandoning universalism is my way of doing justice to 
the claims of ironists whom Habermas distrusts: 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida. Habermas looks atthese 
men from the point of view of public needs. I agree with 
Habermas that as public philosophers they are at best 
useless and at worst dangerous, but I want to insist on 
the role they and others like them can play in 
accommodating the ironist’s private sense of identity to 
her liberal hopes. All that is in question, however, is 
accommodation -  not synthesis. My "poeticized" culture 
is one which has given up the attempt to unite one’s 
private ways of dealing with one’s finitude and one’s
19sense of obligation to other human beings.
Let us pass on to the other of the two rejected, Michel Foucault.
2 .
Foucault in Rorty’s view, as we said, is an ironist who is 
unwilling to be a liberal. One could see some incoherence here, 
for the liberal is someone for whom, according to the definition of 
Judith Skhlar often referred to in Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity, "cruelty is the worst thing we do" -  and Foucault's 
philosophizing is filled with images, descriptions and analyses of 
cruelty over the period of several recent centuries (from the "ship 
of the fools" to execution of Damiens the regicide to visible and 
invisible cruelty of prisons, asylums and hospitals). And yet for 
pragmatism -  and for Rorty’s neopragmatism as well -  the crucial 
belief is in the "hope" mentioned in the beginning of this excursus. 189
18 David Hall, Richard Rorty. Prophet and Poet of the New Pragmatism 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), p. 153.
19 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 68.
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Let us remind the description of liberal ironists from Contingency, 
Irony, and Solidarity, "liberal ironists are people who include 
among these ungroundable desires their own hope that suffering 
will be diminished, that the humiliation of human beings by other 
human beings may cease"20 The theme of "hope" appears in 
many Rorty’s texts (even in some of his titles, for instance: 
"Method, Social Science, and Social Hope" from Consequences 
of Pragmatism or "Private Irony and Liberal Hope" from 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity). I take it to be one of the most 
important themes in Rorty’s philosophy, mainly owing to 
"European connections" of it that are of interest to me here: to put 
it in broad terms, that part of French philosophy which followed 
Heidegger and Nietzsche (often having abandoned Marx and 
Hegel earlier) does not leave social hope for the future, being a 
disillusioned discourse about the reality rather than hopeful 
proposal for the future.21 Two poles: hope/hopelessness and the 
present/future (obviously connected with a different attitude 
towards utopias in the two traditions) can be seen as determining 
significant differences between Rorty and French postmodern 
philosophers. Thus also the two poles include: optimism contra 
melancholy, belief in salutary power of democracy contra 
nostalgia, self-certainty as opposed to hesitations and permanent 
doubts. Philosophy as a product of two cultures, one of which was 
fed by the utopia of unlimited freedom and unlimited possibilities, 
the o ther was p lagued by specters of na tiona lism s, 
totalitarianisms, and hence was seduced by the faith in the 
emancipation of (once and for all) the whole humanity. It is 
interesting to remind now what Rorty thinks of American culture 
(interviewed by Giovanna Borradori):
American culture is essentially political. America was 
founded upon an ethical concept of freedom. It was 
founded as the land of the freest society, the place where 
democracy is at its best, where the horizons are open.
20 Ibidem, p. x v -  emphasis mine.
21 See a very interesting book by Vincent Descombes, Modem French 
Philosophy (Cambridge: CUP, 1980). See also my "excursus" on Hegel.
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There is a kind of national romance about a country that 
says, "We are different from Europe because we made 
a fresh start. We do not have traditions, we can create 
human beings as they are supposed to be". I think that 
the romanticism about America runs through from 
Emerson to Dewey. Unfortunately, it has been lost. It’s 
been lost quite recently, around the time of the Vietnam 
War.22 2345
America had the feeling that it was "the country of the future", 
he says. There was no such a feeling in Europe of the twentieth 
century -  with the exception of new Italy, new Germany or new 
Russia, which, in the long run, was a very expensive lesson for the 
humankind. Therefore it is difficult to speak of "hope" in today’s 
French postmodern philosophers of whom we are writing here. In 
Rorty the belief in the role of "hope" in philosophy increases, 
allowing him at he same time to distance himself from e.g. Foucault 
and Lyotard. In politics hope should replace knowledge (which 
philosophers tried to achieve), and the most important distinction 
for the pragmatist is the one between the past and the future - 
which "can substitute for all the old philosophical distinctions".
Returning to Michel Foucault from whom we were led away due 
to generalizations about pragmatic "hope", Rorty claims that from 
the circle of liberal ironists he is excluded by virtue of the lack of 
hope for the change for the better in the present, lack of chances 
given to the future (which is a caricature, to an extent, especially 
considering the period following ’68 to the publication of the first 
volume of The History of Sexualit)?5). The liberal ironist should 
combine two projects: his private project of self-creation and public
22 Richard Rorty in Giovanna Borradori, The American Philosopher( Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 109-em phasis mine.
23 Ibidem, p. 109.
24 Richard Rorty, "Truth Without Correspondence to Reality", a typescript, 
p. 3.
25 See philosophical biographies of Michel Foucault by David Macey, The 
Lives of Michel Foucault (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994), Didier Eribon, 
Michel Foucault, transl. B. Wing (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1991) or a more 
contextual book also by Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault et ses contemporains 
(Paris: Fayard, 1994).
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project of expanding the range of consciousness of common 
"we"26 It does not suffice to recognize -  and describe -  evil in 
Rorty’s view, one also has to participate in the development of 
moral consciousness that would allow to fight that evil in the future. 
Hope must be present -  the hope that evil and cruelty can be 
overcome. Foucault, like Deleuze and Lyotard, do not provide us 
according to Rorty with reasons to choose this rather than that 
direction in a potential development of society. Foucault can be 
read as a stoic, "a dispassionate observer of the present social 
order, rather than its concerned critic".27 289He lacks the "rhetoric of 
emancipation", his work can be characterized with "extraordinary 
dryness" produced by the lack of identification with any socialpo
context on his part By saying that he would like to write so as 
"to have no face", as he says in the Archeology of Knowledge, he 
excludes himself from membership in Rorty’s utopia. As Rorty 
writes in his text on Habermas and Lyotard: "He forbids himself 
the tone of the liberal sort of thinker who says to his fellow-citizens: 
'We know that there must be a better way to do things than this; 
let us look for it together’. There is no ’we’ to be found in Foucault’s
O Q
writings, nor in those of many of his French contemporaries". It 
is precisely here that there is a memorable phrase that Foucault 
writes from a point of view light-years away from the problems of 
contemporary society... (Habermas, on the contrary, was struck 
by "the political vitality of the vulnerable, subjectively excitable,
26 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 64, n. 24.
27 Richard Rorty, "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity'', PP 2, p. 173. 
And it is interesting to note how he differs in that view from Jürgen Habermas 
from an (exceptional for him, one must admit) text about a Foucauldian reading 
of Kant’s "What Is the Enlightenment?", where Habermas says: "And yet in him 
the stoic attitude of keeping an overly precise distance, the attitude of the 
observer obsessed with objectivity, was peculiarly entwined with the opposite 
element of passionate, self-consuming participation in the contemporary 
relevance of the historical moment” . Rorty precisely -  in the passages quoted 
above -  opposed this particular reading of Foucault by Habermas. Jürgen 
Habermas, The New Conservatism (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1989), "Taking 
Aim at Heart of the Present", p. 173.
28 Richard Rorty, "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity", PP 2, p. 174
29 Ibidem, p. 174.
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morally sensitive intellectual"30 312). Let us remember -  pragmatism 
is the philosophy of solidarity rather than that of despair. 1
When Michel Foucault takes hope away, he becomes 
dangerous; as Rorty puts it in an interview:
He was a remarkable man; he had a great imagination, 
and he wrote memorable books. Foucault has been the 
most influential figure on the culture of the American left, 
but his influence has been dangerous. The result has
qp
been the "disengagement" of intellectuals.
The difference between pragmatists and philosophers from the 
Nietzsche -  Heidegger -  Foucault line would consist also in that 
they did not share optimism as to the future of liberal, democratic
q q
societies. Hope has the priority to wisdom, tomorrow -  to 
yesterday, "democracy" to "philosophy"... And this determines the 
picture of Foucault in Rorty’s writings.
We should remember, however, about the other side, less 
present and more fully exposed perhaps only in one text -  the side 
as usual associated with the general opposition between the 
private and the public -  about Foucault as a "knight of autonomy". 
I would like merely to draw attention to a similar Rorty’s strategy 
to Foucault and to Derrida, although with a much smaller intensity. 
I get the impression from reading various texts and reviews that 
Foucault, like Derrida (which I am discussing separately), is used 
by Rorty as a point of reference in his attempts of searching for his 
own philosophical identity. Foucault is either criticized for the lack 
of "we" in his texts -  or praised for "searching for autonomy" of 
which he is a "knight". Praises are mixed with criticisms, although 
fundamentally the reading of him does not get changed. What
30 Jürgen Habermas, “Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present“, p. 174.
31 Richard Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity?", PP 1, p. 33.
32 Richard Rorty in Giovanna Borradori, p. 111. Which does not quite amount 
to a serious statement made elsewhere that Foucault was one of the three 
founding fathers of "deconstruction" (apart from Derrida and de Man) -  
responsible for its "left slant". See Richard Rorty, "Deconstruction", a typescript,
P-3.
33 See Richard Rorty, ibidem, p. 18.
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changes is Rorty’s aff/fucfe towards philosophy and philosophizing 
-  or, to put it mildly, what gets changed is the favored side from 
the opposition between self-creation/solidarity. It is important to 
bear this in mind while reading all Rorty’s texts about his French 
contemporaries.
Passing for a moment to a more general remark: Rorty’s 
philosophizing can also be read as attempts of appropriation of 
European philosophical heritage by pragmatic tradition by means 
of showing that -  as a matter of fact -  all representatives of the 
former say the same as pragmatists do (but, in a worse manner 
due to various reasons). With such a general picture, Nietzsche 
says "the same" as James, Heidegger the same as Dewey, finally, 
Derrida and Foucault -  the same as "updated Dewey" and, 
partially, Rorty himself. In the most explicit way this strategy is 
shown probably in Consequences of Pragmatism, especially in the 
text about "Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century 
Textualism". Rorty’s conclusion from this text is the following: "I 
conclude, therefore, that textualism [that is, let us hasten to add, 
Deconstructionists from Yale, Derrida or Foucault] has nothing to 
add to romanticism and pragmatism" 34 The case with Foucault is 
similar, in Rorty’s reading he merely "updates Dewey"34 5 but what 
separates him from Dewey is the lack of hope: "Although Foucault 
and Dewey are trying to do the same thing, Dewey seems to me 
to have done it better, simply because his vocabulary allows room 
for unjustifiable hope, and an ungroundable but vital sense of 
human solidarity".36 Thus, let us make a very important point: 
Rorty characterizing textualists -  "strong misreaders” in Harold 
Bloom’s terms -  is writing about himself, about his own use of them 
in producing his own narratives about the history of philosophy. In 
1981, the year of the first publication of the essay, this was not fully 
clear, as this was not clear a year later when the essay was 
republished in Consequences of Pragmatism. With the passage 
of time, however, the passage quoted below began to fit to Rorty
34 Richard Rorty, CP, p. 154 -  emphasis mine.
35 Richard Rorty, "Method, Social Science, Social Hope", CP, p 207.
36 Ibidem, p. 208.
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himself -  appearing later on in various places in different versions 
as a descriptions of his own work37 38:
The critic asks neither the author nor the text about their 
intentions but simply beats the text into a shape which 
will serve his own purpose. He makes the text refer to 
whatever is relevant to that purpose. He does it by 
imposing a vocabulary -  a "grid", in Foucault’s 
terminology -  on the text which may have nothing to do 
with any vocabulary used in the text or by its author, and 
seeing what happens. The model here is not the curious 
collector of clever gadgets taking them apart to see what 
makes them work and carefully ignoring any extrinsic 
end they may have, but the psychoanalyst blithely
interpreting a dream or a joke as a symptom of homicidal
• 38 mama.
This is the way textualists should be, as opposed to Rorty. This 
is the way Rorty himself is -  in his later self-descriptions! If we are 
unwilling to call this an "evolution”, let us call this a "change" or 
"development". Rorty takes the method of textualists as he 
describes it, sticking until today to the pragmatic theme of "hope", 
absent in "twentieth-century textualists".
Rorty’s criticism of Foucault for the latter’s lack of a positive 
program for the future has been on the same level in a recent 
dozen or so years in his philosophy. Already in his review of the 
collection of interviews Power/Knowledgefrom 1981 he comes to 
the conclusion that Foucault had not achieved what only Dewey 
had managed to achieve: namely, a combination of Nietzschean 
skepticism to science and philosophy with Marxian social attitude. 
Although Foucault goes "beyond Nietzsche and Marx”, as the title
37 See for instance Rorty’s text about Umberto Eco from Interpretation and 
Overinterpretation (Cambridge: CUP, 1992) where he says about his "pragmatist 
grid" that he imposes on whatever he reads, or his response to Jacques 
Bouveresse from Lire Rorty (Paris: L’eclat, 1992) where he accounts for his 
readings of Derrida and Freud.
38 Richard Rorty, "Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century 
Textualism", CP, p.151.
of the text says, nevertheless his attempt to find utility for 
philosophy fails because he does not speculate on the possible 
future utopias, and his suggestions on the subject of social reforms
O Q
"remain allusions". Foucault, who does not dream about the 
future in the way Rorty does -  cuts himself off the possibility of 
participating in Rorty’s utopia. He does not propose the vision of 
the future -  but merely, let us remind, "writes the history of the 
present", as he says in Discipline and Punish. Destructive efforts, 
unmasking power in all its manifestations are not enough, one can 
almost hear Rorty, what is needed is a constructive part and the 
one who "seems to hate the bourgeoisie more than he loves 
anyone else"39 40 lacks one.
Rorty applies to Habermas and Foucault, as we have seen, a 
serious side of irony, while for Heidegger and Derrida he uses a 
playful tone, the other side of irony, of which we are writing 
separately as one of strategies of achieving fame and immortality. 
Only the ironist who all the time has two opposite views at his 
disposal is able to do this (and perhaps the best example is the 
text about "moral identity" and "private autonomy" in Foucault who 
is allowed there not to take care of the social context of his 
philosophy as opposed to the picture in all other writings Rorty 
devoted to him...)
3.
I think it might be interesting to show Foucault’s account of the 
role of the philosopher in culture as well as his account of the 
relations between philosophy and politics. For one thing is 
Foucault as read by Rorty, as needed by Rorty (for his own 
identification as a philosopher), still another is Foucault shown as 
a strictly French thinker, immersed in problems and questions put 
forward by e.g. Roland Barthes, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice 
Blanchot or Georges Bataille. The contrast between the two 
pictures may, I hope, tell us more about Rorty’s philosophy, being 
its additional context.
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39 Richard Rorty, "Beyond Nietzsche and Marx", London Review of Books, 
19 Feb. 1981, p. 5.
40 Ibidem, p. 6.
The Sartrian opposition between the aesthete and the 
committed writer from "What Is Literature?'1, as well as its 
Barthesian inversion in the form of authors/writers from "Authors 
and Writers", have not been seriously challenged until Michel 
Foucault -  whose intellectuel universel, to be replaced by 
intellectuel spécifique, takes the meaning of both parts of the said 
dichotomy. The point is writing, writer and his place in French 
culture:
the intellectual par excellence used to be a writer -  as 
universal consciousness, free subject, he was opposed 
to those who were just competences in the service of the 
State or the Capital -  as technicians, judges, teachers. 
Since then ... the threshold of writing (écriture) as a 
sacralizing mark (marque sacralisante) of the intellectual 
has disappeared41.
The writer fighting for maintaining his political privileges has 
become in Foucault’s view a figure of the past -  all that "feverish 
theoretization of writing which we witnessed in the sixties was 
undoubtedly just a swansong"42, and besides, it produced "so 
second-rate (médiocres) literary works". It was not accidentally 
that Foucault -  as opposed to, for instance, Jacques Derrida -  
often stressed that he had never felt to have a vocation of a writer. 
"I don’t consider that writing -  he will say in 1978 -  is my job and 
I don’t think that holding a pen is -  for me, I am speaking only of 
myself -  a sort of absolute activity that is more important that 
everything else".43 Foucault’s response to Sartre and Barthes, to
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41 Michel Foucault, "Entretien avec Michel Foucault" in a monumental 
volume of Dits et écrits 1954-1988, D. Defertet F. Ewald (eds.) (Paris: Gallimard, 
1994), to which I will be referring here; vol. Ill (1976-1979), p. 155.
42 Michel Foucault, ibidem, p. 155.
43 Michel Foucault, "On Power" in the volume Politics, Philosophy, Culture 
edited by L.D. Kritzman (New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 96. Let us add here, by 
way of a contrast, that Derrida on numerous occasions wrote and said about his 
passion as a writer, see e.g. "Une ’folie’ doit veiller sur la pensée" in Points de 
suspension. Entretiens (Paris: Galilée, 1992), pp. 349-376 or in "This Strange 
Institution Called Literature", Acts of Literature, ed. by D. Attridge (New York: 
Routledge), 1992, pp. 33-79.
the split present in French culture for over a hundred years -  and 
especially to the particular place accorded to the writer -  was to 
be the figure of the "specific intellectual" who no longer derives 
from the jurist and the writer but from the savant and the expert 
(like in Oppenheimer or earlier already in Darwin).
Thus Foucault in my reading rejects both traditional functions 
of writing (and writer): the avant-garde (textual) and the political 
(communal) one. So what is he left with? Not much, it seems, 
although at the same time there remains the unperformable: local 
struggles described above and -  rather impossible, in the long run
-  struggles with one’s own incarnation as the "universal 
intellectual". For how is one to make generalizations from local 
positions about precisely these positions, how is one to generalize 
without making reference to a recent role (whose clearly criticized 
representative is obviously Jean-Paul Sartre, the gourou of the 
post-war France), bashing it, showing its incoherence, invalidity, 
even harmfulness? How to be both a local specialist and a 
theoretician of that local, intellectual specialization? How to 
convince others to that role, being oneself -  functionally -  a man 
from the previous epoch? Michel Foucault had to fight such a fight 
with himself, he had to promote in the name of universal reasons 
and in its terms a new -  "specific" -  function of the intellectual. He 
was, to be sure, perfectly well aware of that contradiction and it is 
perhaps therefore that in his work -  like perhaps in no other work 
of a living contemporary French philosopher -  there are so many 
discussions about the place of the intellectual (or-the philosopher
-  depending of the period of his work) and his possible role in 
culture and society.
A careful tracing of Foucault’s changing answers to that 
question would be a fascinating task that would throw additional 
light to intellectual ruptures, subsequent new beginnings of the one 
who always wrote in order "to have no face" (Archeology of 
Knowledge), to attempt to "think differently" (The Use of Pleasure)
-  starting with the early seventies, a famous conversation with 
Gilles Deleuze, genealogical struggles with Power, to the first 
volume of The History of Sexuality, its last two volumes as well as 
to dozens of texts and interviews from that feverish and extremely
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prolific period of his life. It was already in Archeology of Knowledge 
that he said in an often referred to and commented on passage: 
"Do not ask me who I am, nor tell me to remain the same: that is 
the morality of a civil state; it rules our documents. Let it leave us 
in peace when we are to write".
Foucault often stated in his interviews that he had never been 
a Freudian, Marxist, structuralist: that he had been seen as an 
anarchist, leftist, disguised Marxist, nihilist, anti-Marxist, 
technocrat, new liberal, but "none of these descriptions is 
important in itself; on the other hand, taken together, they 
nevertheless mean something. And I must admit I rather like what 
they mean"44 Precisely so, without consenting to any other’s 
description of himself, he all the time kept looking for a 
paradefinition of what he was doing as a philosopher, sociologist, 
finally, as a man. As Maurice Blanchot puts it: "what seems to me 
to be difficult -  and privileged -  position of Foucault might be the 
following: do we know who he is, since he doesn’t call himself (he 
is on a perpetual slalom course between traditional philosophy and 
the abandonment of any pretension to seriousness) either a 
sociologist or a historian or a structuralist or a thinker or a 
metaphysician?".45 We still do not know "who he is", as he does 
not want to join known and respected traditional disciplines which 
he detests as long as he has not redefined them. Michel Foucault, 
looking for himself, for many years was asking, among other 
things, what the philosopher is doing when he is philosophizing. 
He kept asking about himself and others. He also kept asking 
about himself as opposed to others and in distinction to them, 
searching for some general meaning of his own work. Let us 
remind here at least several ideas that appear in his writings in 
that context.
44 Michel Foucault, "Polémique, politique et problématisations", Dits et écrits, 
vol. IV, 1980-1988, p. 598 (published for the first time in English in P. Rabinow’s 
volume).
45 Maurice Blanchot, "Michel Foucault as I Imagine Him" in 
Foucault/Blanchot, trans. by J. Mehlman and B. Massumi (New York: Zone 
Books, 1990), p. 93.
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4.
In 1972 in a conversation with Deleuze -  later to be known as 
"Intellectuals and Power" -  Foucault said that during May events 
in France
the Intellectual discovered that the masses no longer 
need him to gain knowledge: they know perfectly well, 
without illusion; they know far better than he and they are 
certainly capable of expressing themselves. But there 
exists a system of power which blocks, prohibits, and 
invalidates this discourse and this knowledge, a power 
not only found in the manifest authority of censorship, 
but one that profoundly and subtly penetrates an entire 
societal network. Intellectuals are themselves agents of 
this system of power -  the idea of their responsibility for 
’consciousness’ and discourse forms part of the system.
The intellectual’s role is ... to struggle against the forms 
of power that transform him into its object and instrument 
in the sphere of ’knowledge’, ’truth’, ’consciousness’, and 
’discourse.46
So if the traditional intellectual is -  as we already know -  the 
writer, there is no possibility of resistance on the part of either 
écrivants or écrivains, either poetry or littérature engagée, against 
that "enigmatic", "at once visible and invisible, present and hidden, 
ubiquitous" Power. It can be said, exit the writer, but who enters 
the stage? Precisely who enters is someone about whom it is 
known from Foucault’s descriptions what he is supposed not to do 
and whom he is supposed not to be. Although the opposition of 
the two types of intellectuals is merely a "hypothesis"47, it is 
directed against the whole French intellectual tradition 48
46 Michel Foucault, "Intellectuals and Power" in Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice. Selected Essays and Interviews, D.F. Bouchard (ed.), Ithaca: Cornell 
UP, 1977, pp. 207-208.
47 Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power" in Power/Knowledge (Brighton: 
Harvester Press, 1980), p. 132.
48 See in this context Krzysztof Pomian’s book The Past as a Subject of 
Knowledge, especially the chapter on "République des lettres as an Ideal 
Community of Scholars", Warsaw: Aletheia, 1992 (in Polish).
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Theory in Foucault’s account is not supposed to be a support 
for practice which, in turn, would be its application; theory does not 
serve practical applications, being local, regional and 
non-totalizing. "This is a struggle against power, a struggle aimed 
at revealing and undermining power where it is most invisible and 
insidious". The point, as Foucault explains to Deleuze, is "to sap 
power, to take power": "it is an activity conducted alongside those 
who struggle for power, and not their illumination from a safe 
distance. A ’theory’ is the regional system of this struggle". The 
writer’s thinking of the world may have been universal, in 
Foucault’s vision suggested here the specific intellectual is 
reduced to play the role of one of many links in an ongoing struggle 
- he is neither a spokesperson of the will of those who fight, nor is 
he their representative (which means drawing radical conclusions 
from questioning representation), nor is he even an interpreter of 
their struggles from a safe place behind his desk. Theory becomes 
practice. Those who until then had been accorded a specific place 
in culture of its "consciousness”, "conscience" and "eloquence" -  
become potential providers of tools for analysis, of the famous 
"toolbox" with the help of which one can make a topographical 
description of a battlefield... For Foucault, his own philosophy was 
not the theory of his practice, his political practice not being a 
application of theories presented in philosophical books of which 
he was the author. As François Ewald, Arlette Farge, and Michelle 
Perrot say in a moving commemorative volume entitled Michel 
Foucault. Une histoire de la vérité: “there are only practices, 
theoretical practices or political practices, totally specific ones".49 50
The intellectual’s work according to Foucault does not consist 
in shaping others’ political will. It rather consists of conducting 
analyses on the grounds of disciplines familiar to him whose aim 
is, as he puts in a conversation with François Ewald, "to question 
over and over again what is postulated as self-evident, to disturb 
people’s mental habits, the way they do and think things, to 
dissipate what is familiar and accepted, to reexamine rules and 
institutions and on the basis of this reproblematization (in which
49 Michel Foucault, "Intellectuals and Power", p. 208.
50 Michel Foucault. Une histoire de la vérité (Paris: Syros, 1985), p. 54.
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he carries out his specific task as an intellectual) to participate in 
the formation of a political will (in which he has his role as a citizen 
to play)".51 Michel Foucault is fully aware of the demise of an old, 
traditional, prophetic function of the intellectual. Those who speak 
and write today are still haunted by the model of a Greek wise man, 
Jewish prophet or a Roman legislator.52 (And it is important to note 
that it was also Sartre who in the last years of his life considered 
breaking with the conception of the "committed writer". In 1974 in 
a discussion with Herbert Marcuse he said that workers "can better 
express what they feel, what they think ... For me, the classical 
intellectual is an intellectual who ought to disappear"53). Foucault 
himself wants to take care of the present, as the most important 
question - is the one about the present.54 And that is what he was 
doing, discussing in his books over the years the relations between 
experience (madness, illness, transgression, sexuality), 
knowledge (psychiatry, medicine, criminology, sexology, 
psychology), and power (institutions connected with the control of 
the individual -  psychiatric or penal ones). As he said in Discipline 
and Punish, what was at stake there -  and surely not only there - 
was "writing the history of the present"55 that would perhaps "make 
the present situation comprehensible and, possibly, lead to 
action".56 That large theme of the "ontology of the present" guided 
Foucault’s thinking in the last years of his life and he found the 
protoplast of this way of thinking about philosophy (as we have 
known at least since Borges that we produce our predecessors) 
in Kant from the text "What Is the Enlightenment?", about which 
he would write and lecture in College de France. The task of
51 Michel Foucault, "The Concern for Truth" in L.D. Krltzman (ed.), p. 265.
52 See the interview with Foucault conducted by B.-H. Lévy, reminded 
recently in the latter's Les Aventures de la liberté. Une histoire subjective des 
intellectuels (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1991), p. 382.
53 Which is reminded by L.W. Kritzman in a "Foreword" to Politics, 
Philosophy, Culture, p. xix. See also R. Goldhorpe, "Understanding the 
committed writer" in The Cambridge Companion to Sartre, Ch. Howells (ed.), 
Cambridge: CUP, 1992, pp. 140-177.
54 As Foucault said: "Genealogy means that I begin my analysis from a 
question posed in the present", "The Concern for Truth", p. 262.
65 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, trans. by A. Sheridan (New York:
Penguin Books, 1979), p. 31.
56 Michel Foucault, "On Power", p. 101.
philosophy is to describe the nature of the present and us in that 
present, he would say57, inscribing his thought in the tradition 
running from Kant to Weber to the Frankfurt School. The late 
Foucault made every attempt to inscribe himself in the Kantian 
tradition of making mature use of reason, but he read Kant through 
the Baudelairean figure of the dandy. In ethics as aesthetics of 
existence in The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self he 
seems to break with an opposition difficult to maintain in practice 
that we are still thinking here of. He moves towards himself, 
towards building his own ethics of self-transformation.58 *
Intellectual work seems not to go beyond oppositions drawn by 
Sartre and Barthes, beyond ourtextualism and communitarianism, 
or romanticism and pragmatism. Foucault becomes Rorty’s 
"knight of autonomy"50 when he notes (in 1983) that for him
intellectual work is related to what you could call 
aestheticism, meaning transforming yourself. ... I know 
very well, and I think I knew it from the moment when I 
was a child, that knowledge can do nothing for 
transforming the world. Maybe I am wrong... But if I refer 
to my own personal experience I have the feeling 
knowledge can’t do anything for us and that political 
power can destroy us. All the knowledge in the world 
can’t do anything against that.60
Thus it is not much that Foucault’s intellectuelspecifique, a new 
figure suggested for our postmodern times, can do. Local and 
regional struggles with power die out, theory is no longer like a
57 Michel Foucault, "CriticalTheory/lntellectual History" in L.D. Kritzman (ed.), 
p. 36.
58 As Sartre said in his Baudelaire: "Baudelaire’s single most favorite activity 
was changing: changing his own body, feelings, life -  in search of an unattainable 
ideal of creating oneself. He works only not to owe anything to anyone, he wants 
to regenerate and correct himself, as one corrects a picture or a poem, he wants 
to correct his own poem for himself..." "Baudelaire in Face of Time and Being" 
in 'What is Literature?’ and Other Essays, a Polish translation (Warsaw: PIW, 
1968), p. 299.
69 See Richard Rorty, "Moral Identity and Private Autonomy: The Case of 
Foucault" in PP 2, pp. 193-198.
60 Michel Foucault, "The Minimalist Self" in L.D. Kritzman (ed.), p. 14.
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fe llow -trave lle r of the masses fighting to take power. 
Parasurrealistic -  that is, modernistic! -  transforming one’s 
existence in a poetic manner has little to do with the Sartrian pole 
of "activism" and "commitment", with making laws, suggesting 
solutions valid always and everywhere, professing about the future 
on the part of (intellectual and philosophical) legislators from a 
universal place accorded by culture in the past. But, on the other 
hand, the aesthetic of existence does not seem to go beyond the 
other pole of Sartre’s and Barthes’ oppositions -  aesthetic, 
narcissistic, dandish, textual. The attempt to go beyond a 
framework imposed on writing and philosophizing some hundred 
years ago, as we try to outline it here, seems to be misguided and 
unsuccessful. The final acceptance of the fact that ”my problem is 
my own transformation" and that what is at stake is "transformation 
of one’s self by one’s own knowledge"61, that, to refer to the 
well-known citation, "we have to create ourselves as a work of art" 
(for our self is not pre-given to us and we do not discover its truth)62 
-  seems to lead back to modernistic oppositions. The point is not 
merely "a certain amount of knowledgeableness”, it is also "the 
knower’s straying afield of himself": "There are times in life when 
the question of knowing if one can think differently than one thinks, 
and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely necessary if 
one is to go on looking and reflecting at all", as he will say in the 
"Introduction" to the second volume of The History of Sexuality.
We would be willing to accept as one of such attempts of the 
said penser autrement the conception of the specific intellectual, 
never developed and made more precise, never put into practice 
i.e. experienced. The "aesthetic of existence" of the last two 
(published) volumes of The History of Sexuality and numerous 
interviews preceding them63 has shown difficulties in going
61 Ibidem, pp. 14, 14.
62 Michel Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of a Work in 
Progress" in The Foucault Reader, P. Rabinow(ed.), New York: Pantheon, 1984 
p. 351.
63 Let us remind here the most important texts for the "aesthetics of 
existence": "Introduction" to The Use of Pleasure (which earlier functioned as a 
separate text), the "Qu’est-ce que les Lumières?" text (from P. Rabinow’s 
collection, and then for the first time in French in the Kantian issue of Magazine 
littéraire, Avril 1993), "L’éthique du souci de soi comme pratique de la liberté" 
(Dits et écrits, IV, pp. 708-729), "Une esthétique de l’existence" (ibidem, pp.
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beyond the pre-existing constant in French thinking. The 
intellectual in a classical sense, banned and criticized -  returned, 
that is to say, who returned was Foucault writing rather than 
("locally and regionally") acting. It turned out that even the idea of 
ethics as aesthetics of existence is an idea of a writer who 
obviously has a different place and different obligations in today’s 
postmodern aura rather than an idea of the one who was born out 
of the "expert" and "savant", i.e. of the specific intellectual. When 
the turmoil of (post-May ’68) struggles with power disappeared, 
when the consciousness of moderate possibilities of the 
philosopher as a philosopher came, what remained was seducing 
with one’s pen and showing oneself as an example for others: a 
classical idea of providing exemplum for one’s descendants.64 
Some parts of The History of Sexuality are disarming in their 
sincerity, in their tone of personal confessions, in their seriousness 
of histories put down by a feverish hand. Foucault -  to return to 
Sartre -  was engaged ("committed") in his writing: not in politics, 
ideology, but in a new, still thought-of morality and ethics. For the 
idea of morality as obedience to a code of rules "is now 
disappearing, as he says, has already disappeared. To this 
absence of a morality, one responds, one must respond, with a 
research which is that of an aesthetics of existence".65
5.
Numerous critics see in Michel Foucault the passion of a 
moralist (e.g. Richard Bernstein), a reproach often directed to him 
being precisely his "cryptonormativism" (e.g. Jürgen Habermas, 
Nancy Fraser), his unwillingness to accept his indebtedness to the 
Enlightenment; for some commentators the philosophy of the late 
Foucault is the "philosophy of freedom" (John Rajchman).66 Who
730-35), as well an English interview given to Dreyfus and Rabinow and 
published as "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of a Work in Progress" 
(in The Foucault Reader)-
64 As is reminded by Tadeusz Komendant, the author of the excellent and 
the only Polish book on Foucault, Powers of Discourse. Michel Foucault in 
Search of Himself (Warsaw: Spacja, 1994), e.g. p. 154.
65 Michel Foucault, "An Aesthetics of Existence" in Foucault Live (Interviews, 
1966-84), trans. by J. Johnston (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989), p. 311.
66 See Richard Bernstein, The New Constellation (Cambridge, MA: MIT
is he? Although in his theory he probably did not manage to 
transcend Sartre’s opposition (Sartre, that "man of the nineteenth 
century who wished to conceive of the twentieth century"), in 
practice, in his written work, one can look for new ways of 
answering the latter’s questions. Hence radically different 
valuations and interpretations of Foucault as a philosopher, 
philosopher of politics or moral philosopher.67 In his practice, the 
author of The History of Sexuality does not fit in the horizon of 
sense outlined in the opposition discussed here, for although for 
some he is a dispassionate "aesthete", for others he is a 
passionate "moralist", a par excellence political philosopher, a 
radical critic of the status quo, an originator of a new politics of 
resistance, a new liberal etc.; for some he is the follower of Kant 
and the light side of sociologie de la modernité, for others the 
follower of the dark, irrational side of modernity, that of Nietzsche 
via Bataille, like in Habermas’ or Ferry/Renaut’s criticism.68 And 
the point is probably not that there are divergent interpretations, 
that is something we are quite used to -  the point may be that we 
need new categories and new dichotomies to attempt to 
domesticate, to tame Foucault’s thought.
A possibility was suggested by Foucault himself by way of 
digression in a long conversation with an Italian communist, 
Duccio Trombadori, in 1978, almost totally unnoticed in literature 
devoted to him.69 He discusses there the question what kind of
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Press, 1992); Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987); Nancy Fraser, "Michel Foucault: a 'Young 
Conservative’?" in Critique and Power. Recasting the Foucault/Habermas 
Debate, M. Kelly (ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994; John Rajchman, Michel 
Foucault. The Freedom of Philosophy (New York: Columbia UP, 1985).
67 Arnold I. Davidson makes it explicit in summarizing sentences of his text: 
"Unless moral philosophers supplement their discussions of moral codes with 
ethics a la Foucault, we will have no excuse against the charge that our treatises 
suffer from an unnecessary but debilitating poverty". That is perhaps the 
strongest opinion about Foucault’s ethics I managed to encounter. See 
"Archeology, Genealogy, Ethics" in Foucault. A Critical Reader, D.C. Hoy (ed.), 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, p. 232.
68 See a (once) influential pamphlet of Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, French 
Philosophy of the Sixties. An Essay on Antihumanism, in which Foucault = 
Heidegger + Nietzsche (like Derrida = Heidegger + Derrida’s style), Amherst: 
The University of Massachusetts Press, 1990, a chapter on "French 
Nietzscheanism" ore.g. p. 123.
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books he had been writing in his lifetime and draws a distinction 
between livre d ’exploration and livre de méthode, or a still different 
one between livre-expérience and livre-vérité. Books-explorations 
and books on the method, books-experiences and books-truths, 
let us say. To be sure, in philosophy the downgraded ones have 
been and still are books-explorations and books-experiences -  
those most precious to Foucault. Books were as rich experiences 
as possible, so that the writer could get out of them as someone 
else, someone new and changed, precisely -  transformé. The 
book transforms both him and what he thinks: "Je suis un 
expérimentateur en ce sens que j ’écris pour me changer 
moi-même".69 70 The author is a writing experimenter who 
transforms himself rather than a theoretician. He does not know 
at the beginning of his road what he is going to think at the end of 
it. Thus, to the question about the sense of philosophical work, we 
get two possible answers -  we either explore the unknown and 
transform ourselves (and somehow incidentally -  we also change 
others, as a book is an invitation to a common participation), or we 
present truth and evidence for it to others.
Returning to alliances with power, returning to philosophy and 
politics, let us say that it is perhaps so that books-truths were -  
potentially could be -  moving on the same tracts with power (with 
it or against it); communicating, proving, justifying, legitimating, 
validating (like in the case of Barthes’ "writers"). The question is 
w he the r the same can be sa id  of ph ilo soph ica l 
books-explorations? It seems to me that the answer is in the 
negative, for they seem to be on a different plane, the plane of 
transforming oneself rather than the world (the plane of changing 
the world only after a round way of changing oneself). I fully agree 
here with Richard Bernstein -  evidently not an enthusiast of 
postmodern thinkers -  who presented the following diagnosis of 
postmodern philosophy:
69 The exception to which I owe my awareness of this passage is Martin Jay 
in his splendid article "The Limits of Limit-Experience: Bataille and Foucault", 
Constellations, vol. 2, No 2,1995.
70 Michel Foucault, Dits et écrits, III, pp. 41-42.
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In the early writings of Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault and 
Rorty these questions [ethical-political -  MK] do not even 
seem to be considered. Yet as we follow the pathways 
of their thinking and writings something curious begins 
to happen -  for each of these thinkers begins to gravitate 
more and more to confronting the ethical-political 
consequences of their own thinking 71
I am personally convinced that it pertains to Derrida - recently 
just a moralist, and no less it does to Rorty and Foucault. 
"Something curious begins to happen" and that "something" in 
question may be associated with a decline of a super-project of 
modernity that makes some questions suddenly appear to be more 
significant to a growing number of people. It is quite revealing to 
compare Foucault, Rorty, and Rorty’s Foucault to see what may 
be at stake in philosophy today.
71 Richard Bernstein, The New Constellation, p. 11 (emphasis mine). And I 
absolutely cannot agree with George Steiner from The Broken Contract when he 
says of deconstruction in the closing sentence that "present masters of 
emptiness care only for fun". At least, if Derrida himself is at stake. (Warsaw: 
Wyd. Instytutu Kultury, 1995), p. 82.
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